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Abstract
This paper presents a sound and complete fault detection approach for cyber-physical sys-
tems represented by hidden-mode switched affine models with time varying parametric un-
certainty. The fault detection approach builds upon techniques from model invalidation. In
particular, a set-membership approach is taken where the noisy input-output data is compared
to the set of behaviors of a nominal model. As we show, this set-membership check can be
reduced to the feasibility of a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which can
be solved efficiently by leveraging the state-of-the-art MILP solvers. In the second part of the
paper, given a system model and a fault model, the concept of T -detectability is introduced. If
a pair of system and fault models satisfies T -detectability property for a finite T , this allows the
model invalidation algorithm to be implemented in a receding horizon manner, without compro-
mising detection guarantees. In addition, the concept of weak-detectability is introduced which
extends the proposed approach to a more expressive class of fault models that capture language
constraints on the mode sequences. Finally, the efficiency of the approach is illustrated with
numerical examples motivated by smart building radiant systems.
1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems are combinations of physical processes and embedded computers. The
embedded computers collect data from the process through sensors and control it in a closed-
loop manner. With the increase in data acquisition and storage capacity and the decrease in
sensor costs, it is possible to collect large amounts of data during the operation of complex cyber-
physical systems. For instance, “a four-engine jumbo jet can create 640 terabytes of data in just
one crossing of the Atlantic Ocean” [1]. As discussed in [2], this exponential growth in the data
collection capabilities is a major challenge for systems and control community. Sensor/information-
rich networked cyber-physical systems, from air traffic or energy networks to smart buildings, are
getting tightly integrated into our daily lives. As such, their safety-criticality increases. For such
systems, it is crucial to detect faults or anomalies in real-time to support the decision-making
process and to prevent potential large-scale failures.
1.1 Contributions
This paper presents a fault detection scheme to enhance the reliability of a class of cyber-physical
systems that are represented by hidden-mode switched affine models with time-varying parametric
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uncertainty. This modeling framework is quite expressive and can be used to describe a wide range
of cyber-physical systems such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems in
smart buildings [3], wind turbines [4], power systems and power electronics, automotive systems,
aircraft, air traffic, and network and congestion [5]. We model faults also in this framework allowing
us to capture many scenarios including cascaded faults or various types of cyber or physical attacks.
Note that linear time invariant systems with or without noise or affine parametric uncertainty are
special cases of the modeling framework.
The proposed fault detection scheme builds on set-membership model invalidation approaches
[6–8]. Unlike many set-membership methods that compute explicit set representations and propa-
gate them via set-valued observers, the proposed method uses an online optimization formulation
for model invalidation that keeps implicit constraints to represent sets. In particular, we show that
model invalidation problem for this class of systems can be reduced to the feasibility of a MILP
problem, which can be checked efficiently using state-of-the-art solvers [9]. Additionally, the con-
cept of T -detectability is introduced, which enables us to apply the model invalidation approach for
fault detection in a receding horizon manner (with a horizon size T ) without losing detection guar-
antees. Even though there are some practical systems with fault models that are T -detectable, a
limited class of system and fault models satisfy this property. We further discuss weak detectability
that incorporates language constraints on the switching sequences of the faults to enable detection
of a broader class of faults. Algorithms that can be used to find the minimum T (if it exists) are
presented.
A preliminary version of this paper is published in [10]. The current paper significantly extends
the model class by allowing uncertainty in variables and considering language constraints in the
mode sequence. Moreover, more efficient MILP-based necessary and sufficient conditions for ver-
ifying T -detectability are given and some connections to mode observability of switched systems
are pointed out.
1.2 Literature Review on Fault Detection
Model-based fault detection has a long history starting with early work on failure detection filters
[11, 12]. A vast majority of fault detection methods are based on residual generation, where the
residual is evaluated by simple thresholding methods or more complicated classifiers to decide
between faulty and normal behaviors [13–16]. The residual generation methods are classified into
three main categories [13]: parameter estimation-based [17], observer-based [18–20] and parity
equation-based [21] techniques. All these residual generation techniques can be implemented in
real-time, but even when a specific fault model exists, their behavior is usually analyzed only
asymptotically and they fail to provide any finite-time detection guarantees.
As an alternative to residual generation, set-membership fault detection methods have been
proposed both for passive [6,22] and active [23–25] fault detection. Some of these methods proceed
by computing convex-hulls of potentially non-convex reachable sets of the system and comparing the
actual output to this set [6]. Since, reachable sets are over-approximated, this leads to only sufficient
conditions, that is, they guarantee there are no false alarms. Scott et al. [25] pose a mixed-integer
quadratic programming problem to find an optimal separating input to detect faults. They use
zonotopes to represent and propagate state constraints. The order of the zonotopes is used to trade-
off between the complexity and the conservativeness of the approach. This approach is extended
in [26] to handle admissible sets in the form of constrained zonotopes and to take advantage of real-
time measurements to calculate an improved separating input. Despite the fact that all the above
mentioned set-membership methods are proposed for linear systems, their scalability is somewhat
limited to be applied in real-time [25].
2
Non-linear and hybrid systems have also attracted notable attention from fault detection com-
munity. Most of the research is concentrated around residual generation type methods [27–29].
De Persis and Isidori [30] develop analytical necessary and sufficient conditions under which the
problem of fault detection and isolation becomes solvable for non-linear systems. However, they
do not particularly address the computational aspects of the problem. Observer-based methods
are employed for fault diagnosis in hybrid systems both when the discrete mode is observed [31]
or hidden [32], using variants of Kalman filters. In recent work [33], Deng et al. investigate fault
diagnosis problem in hybrid systems, by constructing a finite abstraction for the hybrid automaton
and analyzing the diagnosability of the abstract system using tools from discrete-event systems,
providing some detection guarantees. However, the mode signal is assumed to be observed in [33].
The notion of T -detectability is closely related to distinguishability of dynamical systems [34,35]
and observability in switched systems [36,37]. If two systems are distinguishable, then there exists
a non-zero input which makes their trajectories different at least for one time instance. In [38],
it is illustrated that if two models are distinguishable for a particular control input, then they
are distinguishable for a generic control law. Lou et. al [39] introduced the concept of input-
distinguishability, which restricts distinguishability to all non-zero inputs contained in a convex
set. Rosa and Silvestre [40] consider the input-distinguishability for discrete time linear time-
invariant systems with bounded disturbance and noise. They provide a necessary and sufficient rank
condition to check for a given size of time horizon (T ) if two systems are input distinguishable or
not. This condition is seldom satisfied in practice, hence they added extra constraint which enforces
the persistence of excitation for disturbance [40]. The concept of T -detectability introduced here is
closely related to absolute input-distinguishability [40]. In other words, T -detectability of a pair of
hidden-mode switched affine models subject to process and measurement noise provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for their input-distinguishability. The time horizon T in detectability is an
upper bound on the detection delays (time from the occurrence of fault to detection alarm) [41–43].
Model invalidation was originally proposed as a way to build trust in models obtained through
a system identification step or discard/improve them before using these models in robust control
design [44]. In model invalidation problem, one starts with a family of models (i.e., a priori or
admissible model set) and experimental input-output data collected from a system (i.e., a finite
execution trace) and tries to determine whether the experimental data can be generated by one
of the models in the initial model family. Its relation to fault and anomaly detection has been
pointed out in [6–8,45] for linear time-varying systems and hybrid systems in autoregressive form.
A fault detection scheme based on model-invalidation for polynomial state space models subject to
noise and uncertainty in parameters is recently proposed in [46]. The convex relaxations for model
invalidation problem mostly provide sufficient conditions that can be efficiently checked to detect
faults but only necessary for large relaxation orders.
Notation: Let x ∈ Rn denote a vector and x(i) indicate its ith element. Also, let A ∈ Rn×m
represent a matrix and A(i, j) indicate the element on the ith row and jth column of the matrix A.
The row range and null space of a matrix A are denoted by Range(A) and Null(A), respectively.
The infinity norm of a vector x is given by ‖x‖ .= maxi x(i). The set of positive and non-negative
integers up to n are denoted by Z+n and Z0n, respectively. A vector of all ones of appropriate size
is denoted by 1. The Hadamard product of two matrices A1 and A2 of the same dimensions is
indicated by A = A1 A2, and defined as A(i, j) .= A1(i, j)A2(i, j) for all i, j.
3
2 Modeling Framework
In this section, we describe the class of systems and the modeling framework considered in this
paper. In particular, we consider discrete-time hidden-mode switched affine models with time-
varying parametric uncertainty that are subject to noise. We refer to these models as SWA models.
SWA models consist of a collection of affine models, which we define first.
Definition 1 (Affine Model) An affine model G∆ with time-varying parametric uncertainty has
the following form:
xk+1 = (A + A
∆
k )xk + (B + B
∆
k )uk + f + f
∆
k
yk = (C + C
∆
k )xk + ηk
, (1)
where xk,uk,yk are the state, input and output at time k, A,B,C, f are the system matrices; and
A∆k ,B
∆
k ,C
∆
k , f
∆
k are the weighted uncertain variable matrices affecting the system at time k. In
particular, for each τ∆k , τ ∈ {A,B,C, f}, we assume:
τ∆k = τˆ ∆τk (2)
for some normalization matrix τˆ with nonnegative entries and uncertainty matrix ∆τk whose entries
satisfy
− 1 ≤ ∆τk(m, l) ≤ 1, (3)
where ∆τk(m, l) corresponds to the uncertainty variable associated with the term on m
th row and lth
column of parameter τ at time k.
For simplicity of notation, we collect the entries of ∆τk for all τ ∈ {A,B,C, f}, in a vector
∆k ∈ Ω ⊂ Rn∆ , where n∆ is the total number of uncertain parameters. It follows from the
assumption (3) that the set Ω of admissible uncertainties is the unit infinity-norm ball in Rn∆ .
Now, we define SWA models, the main modeling framework used in this paper.
Definition 2 (Switched Affine Model) A switched affine (SWA) model is defined by:
G = (X , E ,U , {G∆i }si=1), (4)
where X ⊂ Rn is the set of states, E ⊂ Rny is the set of measurement noise values, U ⊂ Rnu is the
set of inputs. The collection {G∆i }si=1 is the set of s affine models. The evolution of G is governed
by:
xk+1 = (Aσk + A
∆
σk,k
)xk + (Bσk + B
∆
σk,k
)uk+
fσk + f
∆
σk,k
yk = (Cσk + C
∆
σk,k
)xk + ηk
, (5)
where σk ∈ {1, . . . , s} indicates the active affine model, i.e., the mode, at time k, and Ai,Bi,Ci, fi
are the system matrices of the affine model G∆i .
In what follows, we assume that the sets of admissible states, inputs and noise are hyper-rectangles
defined as:
X = {x | Xl ≤ x ≤ Xu}, (6)
E = {η | l ≤ η ≤ u}, (7)
U = {u | Ul ≤ u ≤ Uu}, (8)
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where subscript l and u denote lower and upper bounds, respectively. The bound on the state
usually represents the part of the state-space where the model is valid and can be taken to be
infinite. The distinction between the noise η and the inputs u is that the former is not measured
at run-time but the latter is measured and can capture operating conditions or effects of other
subsystems on the specific system under consideration. Therefore, typically both the noise and
inputs are bounded in some range. If a closed-loop system is considered and the feedback law is
already in place, it is possible to omit the inputs, and the proposed methods are trivially applicable
in that case as well.
For the sake of simplicity in notation, we omit process noise, possible affine term in the output
equation and the feed-forward term in the output equation in Def. 1. It is, however, straightfor-
ward to apply the proposed techniques when considering all the mentioned terms. Similarly, the
uncertainty model can also be generalized to capture some correlations between entries.
3 Problem Statements
In this section, we present some preliminary definitions together with the two problems, solutions
of which provide the basis of the proposed fault detection approach.
Definition 3 (length-N behavior) The length-N behavior associated with an SWA model G is the
set of all length-N input-output trajectories compatible with G, given by the set
BNswa(G) .=
{{uk,yk}N−1k=0 | uk ∈ U , ∃xk ∈ X , ηk ∈ E ,
∆k ∈ Ω, σk ∈ Z+s : (5) holds for all k ∈ Z0N−1
}
.
With slight abuse of terminology, when N is clear from the context, we call BNswa(G) just the
behavior of G.
The consistency set associated with a behavior of an SWA model is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (consistency set) Let {uk,yk}Nk=0 be an input-output trajectory over a time window
[0, N ]. The consistency set associated with {uk,yk}Nk=0 of an SWA model G is defined as follows:
TG
({uk,yk}Nk=0) .= {x0:N , η0:N ,∆0:N , σ0:N |
(5)-(7) hold for all k ∈ Z0N
}
, (9)
where subscript 0 : N indicates all the samples between time instances 0 and N .
In words, the consistency set is the set of state, noise, uncertainty and mode sequences that evolves
through dynamics of the SWA model (5), and given the input sequence {uk}Nk=0 ∈ UN+1 generates
the output sequence {yk}Nk=0. As the input sequence is needed to calculate the consistency set,
we can check whether the bounds on uk, (cf. (8)) are violated or not, separately; and if they are
violated we take TG
({uk,yk}Nk=0) = ∅ trivially.
The first problem we address in this paper is the model invalidation problem. Roughly speaking,
given an input-output trajectory and an SWA model, the model invalidation problem is to determine
whether or not the data is compatible with the model. This problem can be formally stated in
terms of behaviors or consistency sets as follows.
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Problem 1 Given {uk,yk}N−1k=0 , an input-output trajectory, and an SWA model G, determine
whether or not the input-output trajectory is contained in the behavior of G. That is, determine
whether or not the following is true
{uk,yk}N−1k=0 ∈ BNswa(G), (10)
or equivalently TG
({uk,yk}N−1k=0 ) 6= ∅.
For the well-posedness of the problems studied, we assume that BNswa(G) 6= ∅ for any positive
integer N . This guarantees that the model is capable of generating some infinite trajectories;
therefore, it does not invalidate itself if one waits long enough.
The abnormal trajectories for a system are those that cannot be generated by the model of a
system.
Definition 5 (abnormal trajectory) An input-output trajectory {uk,yk}N−1k=0 is called abnormal for
an SWA model G if
{uk,yk}N−1k=0 /∈ BNswa(G),
or equivalently TG(
{
uk,yk
}N−1
k=0
) = ∅.
With this definition, it is clear that a trajectory being abnormal is equivalent to the model
being invalid for that trajectory. Therefore, a solution to Problem 1 can be readily used to detect
abnormal trajectories or anomalies. Note that detecting abnormal trajectories does not require
explicit models for the anomaly. Given that a cyber-physical system can fail (or be attacked) in
infinitely many different ways, not needing to model these failure modes is advantageous. On the
other hand, if one has an explicit model for a given fault, then this information can be used to
develop more efficient fault detection schemes. In this paper, we represent faults also using SWA
models. Such fault models can be obtained either using first principles in cases when the fault leads
to a change in physical parameters or using robust system identification techniques in cases where
there is enough data from the faulty behavior.
Definition 6 (fault) A fault model for a system with an SWA model G = (X , E ,U , {G∆i }si=1) is
another SWA model Gf = (X¯ , E¯ , U¯ , {G¯∆i }s¯i=1) with the same number of states, inputs and outputs.
In general, we expect faults to lead to abnormal trajectories. One can argue that a fault
that does not lead to an abnormal trajectory, might not be that important from an operational
standpoint. Moreover, it is not possible to detect a fault that has trajectories that are identical
to the system trajectories. Next, we define T -detectability, which is a property of a given pair of
SWA fault and system models, that measures how long it takes for a fault to lead to an abnormal
trajectory.
Definition 7 (T -detectability) A fault model Gf for a system model G is called T -detectable1, if
BTswa(G) ∩ BTswa(Gf ) = ∅, where T is a positive integer.
Clearly, if a fault is T -detectable for a system, then it is T¯ -detectable for the same system for
all T¯ ≥ T .
The second problem we are interested in is the characterization of the T -detectability property
for a pair of fault and system models.
1This notion is symmetric and therefore we also say G and Gf are T -detectable.
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Problem 2 Given two SWA models, G and Gf , and an integer T , determine whether the fault
model Gf is T -detectable for the system model G, or not. That is, check if the set
BTswa(G) ∩ BTswa(Gf ), (11)
is empty or not.
As we show later in the paper, if a fault model is T -detectable for a system model, then a
solution to the model invalidation problem in a receding horizon manner with a fixed length T can
be used to efficiently detect faults without compromising the detection guarantees.
4 Fault Detection Scheme
In this section, we propose a fault detection scheme based on model invalidation. We initially
present optimization based solutions to model invalidation and T -detectability problems. Addi-
tionally, we introduce T -weak detectability property that allows us to incorporate constraints on
the mode sequences. Finally, we present an efficient fault detection scheme for T -(weak) detectable
faults.
4.1 Model Invalidation
As discussed in Section 3, given a model of a system, detecting an abnormal trajectory is equivalent
to model being invalid. Therefore, the solution to model invalidation problem, can be readily
applied for detecting anomalies in a system from the input/output measurements. Next, we define
a series of feasibility problems that are equivalent to Problem 1. That is, for a given input-output
trajectory {uk,yk}N−1k=0 , we encode the consistency set TG
({uk,yk}N−1k=0 ) with a feasibility problem.
Since we have a hidden-mode switched system model, at each time, we require the data to satisfy
the dynamic constraints for at least one mode. We ensure the satisfaction of state and output
equations by leveraging ideas from big M formulation of mixed integer programming [47, 48]. In
order to capture this, consider the following mixed integer non-linear problem:
Find xk, ηk,∆k, ai,k, ∀k ∈ Z0N−1,∀i ∈ Z+s (12)
s.t. ∀k ∈ Z0N−1, ∀i ∈ Z+s :
− a¯i,kM1 ≤ xk+1 − (Ai + A∆i,k)xk − (Bi + B∆i,k)uk − fi − f∆i,k ≤ a¯i,kM1,
− a¯i,kM1 ≤ yk − (Ci + C∆i,k)xk − ηk ≤ a¯i,kM1,∑
i∈Z+s ai,k = 1, ai,k ∈ {0, 1},
Xl ≤ xk ≤ Xu, l ≤ ηk ≤ u,
τ∆i,k = τˆ i ∆τi,k, τ ∈ {A,B,C, f}
|∆Bi,k(m, p)| ≤ 1, |∆fi,k(m)| ≤ 1 ∀m ∈ Z+n , p ∈ Z+nu
|∆Ai,k(m, l)| ≤ 1, ∀m, l ∈ Z+n ,
|∆Ci,k(o, l)| ≤ 1, ∀o ∈ Z+ny , ∀l ∈ Z+n ,
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
(12d)
(12e)
(12f)
(12g)
(12h)
where a¯i,k = 1− ai,k and M is a sufficiently large number.
The constraints (12c) on the binary variables ai,k ensure that the data is compatible with at
least one of the modes i at each time k. Note that in (12a)-(12b), there exist bilinear terms in the
form of products of state and uncertainty variables. In what follows, we first apply a change of
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variables that renders these constraints linear. However, the constraints (12g)-(12h) are no longer
linear in the new variables. Finally, we replace (12g)-(12h) with equivalent constraints that are
linear in the new variables.
Let us start by introducing the matrix variables ZAi,k and Z
C
i,k with entries:
Zτi,k(m, l)
.
= τˆ i(m, l)∆
τ
i,k(m, l)xk(l), τ ∈ {A,C}. (13)
Then, we can rewrite constraints (12a)-(12b) as linear constraints in optimization variables:
− a¯i,kM1 ≤ xk+1 −Aixk − ZAi,k1− (Bi + B∆i,k)uk − fi − f∆i,k ≤ a¯i,kM1,
− a¯i,kM1 ≤ yk −Cixk − ZCi,k1− ηk ≤ a¯i,kM1.
(14a)
(14b)
Bound constraints for the new variables can be obtained using conic equivalences [49]. In particular,
constraints (12e) and (12g)-(12h) are equivalent to the following constraints in the new variables:
∀m, l ∈ Z+n , ∀o ∈ Z+ny :
|ZAi,k(m, l)| ≤ |Aˆi(m, l)||xk(l)|
|ZCi,k(o, l)| ≤ |Cˆi(o, l)||xk(l)|.
(15a)
(15b)
Proposition 1 Given an SWA model G and an input-output trajectory {uk,yk}N−1k=0 , assume there
exists a large enough M such that the following holds for all admissible states, uncertainty and noise
values:
|xk+1 − (Ai + A∆i,k)xk − (Bi + B∆i,k)uk − fi − f∆i,k| ≤M1,
|yk − (Ci + C∆i,k)xk − ηk| ≤M1,
(16)
then the model is invalidated if and only if the following problem is infeasible
Find xk, ηk, ai,k,Z
A
i,k,∆
B
i,k,Z
C
i,k,∆
f
i,k,∀i ∈ Z+s ,∀k ∈ Z0N−1 (PMI)
s.t. {(12c)-(12f), (14), (15)} , ∀k ∈ Z0N−1, ∀i ∈ Z+s .
Proof: If condition (16) holds, then the satisfaction of state and output evolution constraints (cf.
(5)) for mode i at time k is equivalent to a¯i,k being zero in (12a)-(12b). As the other constraints
in the consistency set and (12) are identical, the infeasibility of (12) is equivalent to the emptiness
of the consistency set, which by definition is equivalent to the invalidation of the model by data.
Therefore it suffices to show the equivalence of (12) and (PMI). Given a feasible point of (12), a
feasible point of (PMI) can be constructed by applying the change of variables introduced by (13).
For the other direction, let x˜k, η˜k, a˜i,k, Z˜
A
i,k, ∆˜
B
i,k, Z˜
C
i,k, ∆˜
f
i,k be a feasible point of (PMI). We will
construct a feasible point xˇk, ηˇk, aˇi,k, ∆ˇ
A
i,k, ∆ˇ
B
i,k, ∆ˇ
C
i,k, ∆ˇ
f
i,k for (12). Take aˇi,k = a˜i,k, which satisfies
the constraints (12c) that is a common constraint. This means that at each time k, there is a unique
mode i∗k such that aˇi∗k,k = 1 and aˇi,k = 0, ∀i 6= i∗k. Furthermore, take xˇk = x˜k, ηˇk = η˜k, ∀k ∈ Z0N−1,
and ∆ˇBi,k = ∆˜
B
i,k, ∆ˇ
f
i,k = ∆˜
f
i,k, ∀i ∈ Z+s , ∀k ∈ Z0N−1. Finally choose the elements of ∆ˇτi,k, τ ∈ {A,C}
as follows:
∆ˇτi,k(m, l) =
0 if τˆi(m, l)xˇk(l) = 0Z˜τi,k1(m)
τˆi(m,l)xˇk(l)
if τˆi(m, l)xˇk(l) 6= 0
(17)
Now, we check the feasibility of chosen variables by plugging them in (12).
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With the choice of ∆ˇτi,k(m, l), τ ∈ {A,C} made in (17), the following is true.
Z˜τi,k1(m) =
∑
l∈Z+n
Z˜τi,k(m, l) =
∑
l∈Z+n
τˆi(m, l)xˇk(l)∆ˇ
τ
i,k(m, l)
= [τ∆i,k.xˇk](m) =⇒ Z˜τi,k1 = τ∆i,k.xˇk.
This proves the equivalence of (14) and (12a)-(12b). Constraints (12c)-(12f) are trivially satisfied
for our choice of feasible point. Now consider (15a), and plug in (17), we have:
|Aˆi(m, l)xˇk(l)∆ˇAi,k(m, l)| = |Aˆi(m, l)||xˇk(l)||∆ˇAi,k(m, l)|
≤ |Aˆi(m, l)||xˇk(l)| =⇒ |∆ˇAi,k(m, l)| ≤ 1.
With the similar analysis for (15b), we can show that with our feasible point choice, from feasibility
of (15), the feasibility of (12g)-(12h) is implied. Therefore, the two problems are equivalent in the
sense that the feasibility of one implies the feasibility of the other. 
We refer to an instance of the problem (PMI) for a given SWA model G and an input-output
trajectory {uk,yk}N−1k=0 as FeasG({uk,yk}N−1k=0 ) in the remainder of the paper.
Remark 1 Assumption (16) for the existence of a large enough M that bounds the state and output
equations is trivially satisfied when the admissible state set X is a bounded set. This assumption
holds in practice, especially because physical systems often have bounded states. If such M exists,
then it can be easily computed based on the admissible set of states, inputs and the model param-
eters. On the other hand, if such an M does not exist (admissible sets are unbounded), then this
formulation does not exactly encode the model invalidation problem. However, it is still possible to
encode the model invalidation problem in an exact manner with a mixed integer linear programming
problem by employing a convex hull reformulation, which is proposed in our earlier work [10]. We
resort to the big M formulation in this work because for both model invalidation and T -detectability,
its computational complexity is lower than other available techniques.
Both the objective function and the constraints of the problem (PMI) are linear except for the
constraints in (15). However, it is straightforward to transform these constraints into a set of linear
constraints as shown in the following remark.
Remark 2 Consider the first constraint in (15): This constraint is in the form of |x| ≤ C|y|, C ≥ 0
and both x and y are variables. Let us introduce a new variable z = |y|. Two cases can be considered:
if y ≥ 0, then z = y and z = −y vice versa. We also assign a binary variable b, which is 1, if y ≥ 0
and 0 otherwise. Then, |x| ≤ C|y| is enforced by the following linear constraints, where M is an
upper bound for 2|y|:
−Cz ≤x ≤ Cz
0 ≤z − y ≤M(1− b)
0 ≤z + y ≤Mb
After this transformation, problem (PMI) becomes a MILP problem in feasibility form.
4.2 T -Detectability
In general, for detecting an arbitrary, unknown fault (or anomaly), one needs to use all the data
that is available, which leads to larger and larger problems as time passes. On the other hand, as
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alluded to earlier, the availability of a fault model can be exploited to develop more efficient fault
detection schemes while preserving the detection guarantees. We are interested in T -detectability
of the pair of system and fault models as a key property that enables us to apply the model
invalidation approach for fault detection in a receding horizon manner, rather than applying it on
the entire time horizon, while preserving all the guarantees for detection. Fig. 1 illustrates the
motivation of introducing the concept of T -detectability.
Figure 1: Left: without T -detectability, the model invalidation has to be applied on an increasing-
size data. Right: with T -detectability, the model invalidation is applied in a receding horizon
manner.
In this section, we develop a MILP characterization of T -detectability property that can be
verified off-line. Let us first make the following assumption on the fault models:
Assumption 1 Faults are persistent, i.e., once occurred it will be permanent.
In Section 5, we show how to relax Assumption 1.
The following proposition formalizes the fact that T -detectable faults can be detected with a
receding horizon algorithm.
Proposition 2 Given a T -detectable fault model Gf for an SWA model G, it is possible to de-
tect the existence of a persistent fault evolving through Gf by checking, at each time k, if FeasG
({uj ,yj}kj=k−T+1) is feasible or not.
Proof: Let a fault occur at time i∗; that is, the input-output trajectory {uj ,yj}j≥i∗ is generated
by the fault model Gf . Because Gf is T -detectable, by Def. 7, there exists k∗ ≤ i∗+T−1 such that
{uj ,yj}k∗j=i∗ /∈ Bk
∗−i∗+1
swa (G). By Proposition 1, this is equivalent to the existence of k∗ ≤ i∗+T − 1
such that FeasG({uj ,yj}k∗j=i∗) is infeasible. Since [i∗, k∗] ⊆ [k∗ − T + 1, k∗], the infeasibility of
FeasG({uj ,yj}k∗j=i∗) implies the infeasibility of FeasG({uj ,yj}k
∗
j=k∗−T+1). 
Now that we have an efficient way to solve fault detection problem for a T -detectable fault, the
next question is: given an integer T , how to check whether a fault is T -detectable for a particular
system or not? In what follows, we give a necessary and sufficient condition under which a fault Gf
is T -detectable for a system G that can be verified by checking the feasibility of MILP certificates.
In terms of consistency sets, Gf is T -detectable for G if for any {uk,yk}T−1k=0 ∈ BTswa(Gf ), we
have T ∗G({uk,yk}T−1k=0 ) = ∅, or equivalently for any {uk,yk}T−1k=0 , the following holds:
T ∗G({uk,yk}T−1k=0 ) ∩ T ∗Gf ({uk,yk}T−1k=0 ) = ∅. (18)
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Consider the following nonlinear feasibility problem:
Find xk, x¯k, ηk, η¯k,uk,∆k, ∆¯k, di,j,k,∀k ∈ Z0T−1,∀i ∈ Z+s , ∀j ∈ Z+s¯ (19)
s.t. ∀k ∈ Z0T−1, ∀i ∈ Z+s , ∀j ∈ Z+s¯ :
− d¯i,j,kM1 ≤ xk+1 − (Ai + A∆i,k)xk − (Bi + B∆i,k)uk − fi − f∆i,k ≤ d¯i,j,kM1,
− d¯i,j,kM1 ≤ x¯k+1 − (A¯j + A¯∆j,k)x¯k − (B¯j + B¯∆j,k)uk − f¯j − f¯∆j,k ≤ d¯i,j,kM1,
− d¯i,j,kM1 ≤ (Ci + C∆i,k)xk + ηk − (C¯j + C¯∆j,k)x¯k − η¯k ≤ d¯i,j,kM1,∑
i∈Z+s
∑
j∈Z+s¯ di,j,k = 1, di,j,k ∈ {0, 1},
Xl ≤ xk ≤ Xu, X¯l ≤ x¯k ≤ X¯u,
l ≤ ηk ≤ u, ¯l ≤ η¯k ≤ ¯u, Ul ≤ uk ≤ Uu,
for τ ∈ {A,C,B, f , A¯, C¯, B¯, f¯} :
τ∆i,k = τˆ i ∆τi,k, |∆τi,k(m, l)| ≤ 1,
(19a)
(19b)
(19c)
(19d)
(19e)
(19f)
(19g)
(19h)
where M is a sufficiently large scalar and d¯i,j,k = 1 − di,j,k. Clearly, the infeasibility of (19) is
equivalent to (18) being true, therefore, the T -detectability of Gf for G. This is stated formally
below.
Proposition 3 Assume there exists a large enough M such that the following holds for all admis-
sible states, uncertainty and noise values for both system and fault models:
|xk+1 − (Ai + A∆i,k)xk − (Bi + B∆i,k)uk − fi − f∆i,k| ≤M1,
|x¯k+1 − (A¯i + A¯∆i,k)x¯k − (B¯i + B¯∆i,k)uk − f¯i − f¯∆i,k| ≤M1,
|(Ci + C∆i,k)xk + ηk − (C¯j + C¯∆j,k)x¯k − η¯k| ≤M1,
(20)
then fault model Gf is T -detectable for the system model G if and only if problem (19) is infeasible.
Proof: The binary variables di,j,k in (19) guarantee that at each time k, there is a mode j of the
fault model Gf and a mode i of the system model G such that the state evolution constraints for
both models are satisfied and the outputs of the two models match. The rest of the proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted for brevity. 
Following steps similar to those in the model invalidation subsection, we derive a MILP problem
equivalent to Problem (19). In order to eliminate the bilinear terms in (19) that are shaped by the
products of state and uncertainty variables, we consider the change of variables introduced by (13).
Similarly, we define ZA¯j,k,Z
C¯
j,k for fault model as:
Zτ¯j,k(m, l)
.
= ˆ¯τ j(m, l)∆
τ¯
j,k(m, l)x¯k(l), τ¯ ∈ {A¯, C¯}. (21)
Note that in contrast to model invalidation problem, inputs are variables for the T -detectability
problem. Therefore, we need to introduce the following change of variables:
Zτi,k(m, p)
.
= τˆ i(m, p)∆
τ
i,k(m, p)uk(p), τ ∈ {B, B¯}. (22)
where the indices cover all the entries of the corresponding matrices. By plugging in the new
variables we can equivalently state the constraints (19a)-(19c) by the following MILP constraints:
− d¯i,j,kM1 ≤ xk+1 −Aixk − ZAi,k1−Biuk − ZBi,k1− fi − f∆i,k ≤ d¯i,j,kM1,
− d¯i,j,kM1 ≤ x¯k+1 − A¯jx¯k − ZA¯j,k1− B¯juk − ZB¯j,k1− f¯j − f¯∆j,k ≤ d¯i,j,kM1.
(23)
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Now, we formulate constraint (19h) in the new variables as MILP constraints, where m, l en-
compass all the entries of the corresponding matrix.
|Zτi,k(m, l)| ≤ |τˆi(m, l)||xk(l)|, τ ∈ {A,C}
|Zτ¯j,k(m, l)| ≤ |ˆ¯τj(m, l)||x¯k(l)|, τ¯ ∈ {A¯, C¯}
|Zτi,k(m, l)| ≤ |τˆi(m, l)||uk(l)|, τ ∈ {B, B¯}
τ∆i,k = τˆi ∆τi,k, |∆τi,k(m, l)| ≤ 1, τ ∈ {f , f¯}.
(24)
The absolute value constraints can be converted to equivalent mixed integer linear constraints as
illustrated in Remark 2.
Theorem 1 The fault model Gf is T -detectable for the system G if and only if (PT ) is infeasible.
Find xk, x¯k,uk, ηk, η¯k, di,j,k,Z
A
i,k,Z
A¯
j,k,Z
B
i,k,Z
B¯
j,k,Z
C
i,k,Z
C¯
j,k,∆
f
i,k, ∆¯
f
j,k
s. t. ∀k ∈ Z0T−1, ∀i ∈ Z+s , ∀j ∈ Z+s¯ : {(19d)− (19f), (23)− (24)}
(PT )
The proof follows essentially the same reasoning as the proof of Proposition 1, i.e., by showing the
feasibility of Problem (19) is equivalent to Problem (PT ), and is omitted for brevity.
4.3 Converse results for detectability
For a given pair of fault and system models and a given integer T , Theorem 1 provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for verifying the T -detectability of the fault for the particular system. In
general, to compute the minimum such T , one needs to start with T = 1 and solve a sequence of
problems of the form (PT ) while incrementing T until infeasibility is achieved. Note that a finite T
does not necessarily exist for all types of faults. Showing that there exist no finite T is equivalent
to proving that the reachable sets of two constrained switched systems always have a non-empty
intersection. This is a notoriously hard problem given that many reachability problems involving
constrained switched systems are not known to be decidable [50].
In what follows we analyze T -detectability in a simplified setting with switched affine au-
tonomous models G, G¯ for the system and the fault, where we omit the inputs, uncertainty, noise
and admissible set constraints on the states. The analysis is based on establishing a relation between
T -detectability and observability of switched systems. We first recall some results on observability
of switched systems from [51] .
Consider an autonomous switched system, G with the following dynamics:
xk+1 = Aσkxk
yk = Cσkxk
, σk ∈ Z+s , (25)
where the state x ∈ Rn and the output y ∈ R. Given a mode sequence σ0:N , the observability
matrix corresponding to this mode sequence is defined as
OG(σ0:N ) .=

Cσ0
Cσ1Aσ0
...
CσNAσN−1 . . .Aσ0
 . (26)
The following result is from [51] (cf. Theorem 1 and Lemma 6 in [51]).
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Lemma 1 There exists a large enough finite number N .= N (s, n) that depends on the number of
modes s and the state dimension n such that if for a mode sequence σ0:N−1 of length N , we have
rank(OG(σ0:N−1)) < n, then for any arbitrary length there exists a mode sequence σˆ of that length
such that:
Range(OG(σˆ)) ⊆ Range(OG(σ0:N−1)). (27)
The number N (s, n) can be recursively computed given the values of s and n. We refer the reader
to [51] for its computation.
Now consider a pair of autonomous switched affine models G, G¯ of the form:
G :

xk+1 = Aσkxk + f
yk = Cσkxk
σk ∈ Z+s
, G¯ :

x¯k+1 = A¯σ¯k x¯k + f¯
y¯k = C¯σ¯k x¯k
σ¯k ∈ Z+s¯
(28)
Our goal is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a finite T for
T -detectability of G and G¯. First we define equivalent linear models both for the system and the
fault by augmenting their states with affine terms. These equivalent systems, denoted by Gaug and
G¯aug, have the following form: [
xk+1
f
]
=
[
Aσk I
0 I
] [
xk
f
]
yk =
[
Cσk 0
] [xk
f
] , σk ∈ Z+s . (29)
In order to check if the two models G, G¯ of the form (28) are not T -detectable, it suffices to check
whether or not there exist initial conditions x0, x¯0 and mode sequences σ, σ¯ of length T such that
the following is true:
OGaug(σ)
[
x0
f
]
−OG¯aug(σ¯)
[
x¯0
f¯
]
= 0, (30)
where this equation is obtained by setting the outputs of the system and fault models to be equal.
Therefore, the set of initial conditions x0, x¯0 and mode sequences σ, σ¯ of length T satisfying (30)
are essentially a projection of the feasible set of the problem (PT ) onto these variables.
Let us define a concatenated switched system:
G˜ :


xk+1
f
x¯k+1
f¯
 =

Aσk I 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 A¯σ¯k I
0 0 0 I


xk
f
x¯k
f¯

yk =
[
Cσk 0 −C¯σ¯k 0
]

xk
f
x¯k
f¯
 , σk ∈ Z
+
s
σ¯k ∈ Z+s¯
(31)
Also define σ˜ as a path of system G˜ that is shaped by choosing paths σ, σ¯ for Gaug, G¯aug, respectively.
In other words, σ˜ take values from Σ˜ = {(i, j) | i ∈ Zs, j ∈ Zs¯}, with |Σ˜| = ss¯. We can write the
observability matrix of the concatenated system for switching signal σ˜ as follows:
OG˜(σ˜) =
[OGaug(σ) −OG¯aug(σ¯)] . (32)
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Then, we can write the condition for not being T -detectable (i.e. (30)) as the existence of x0, x¯0
and σ˜ such that:
OG˜(σ˜)
[
xᵀ0 f
ᵀ x¯ᵀ0 f¯
ᵀ]ᵀ = 0. (33)
Theorem 2 Two switched affine models G, G¯ of the form (28) are not T -detectable for any finite
T if and only if the problem (PT ) is feasible for T = N (ss¯, 4n).
Proof: If (PT ) is infeasible for T = N (ss¯, 4n), then the pair is trivially T -detectable. If (PT ) is
feasible for T = N (ss¯, 4n), then there exists initial conditions x0, x¯0 and mode sequences σ, σ¯ of
lengthN (ss¯, 4n) such that (33) holds. By Lemma 1, for the switched system (31), if rank(OG˜(σ1)) <
4n for a σ˜1 of length N (ss¯, 4n), then for any arbitrary time horizon T , there exists a mode sequence
σ˜2 of length T such that Range(OG˜(σ˜2)) ⊆ Range(OG˜(σ˜1)), which implies that Null(OG˜(σ˜1)) ⊆
Null(OG˜(σ˜2)). Therefore if there exist initial conditions x0, x¯0 that satisfy[
xᵀ0 f
ᵀ x¯0ᵀ f¯ᵀ
]ᵀ ∈ Null(OG˜(σ˜1)), (34)
we have [
xᵀ0 f
ᵀ x¯0ᵀ f¯ᵀ
]ᵀ ∈ Null(OG˜(σ˜2)). (35)
Since σ˜2 is of arbitrary length, and by noting that any mode sequence for (31) can be mapped to
mode sequences for G and G¯ of the same length, we conclude that the two models G and G¯ are not
T -detectable for any finite T . 
Corollary 1 Two affine models G, G¯ of the form (1) are not T -detectable for any finite T if and
only if the problem (PT ) is feasible for T = 2n+ 1.
Proof: The feasible set of the problem (PT ) in this case projected onto the initial states is the
set of x0, x¯0 satisfying: [
C −C¯] [x0
x¯0
]
= 0
[OG(2n) −OG¯(2n)]([A− I 00 A¯− I
] [
x0
x¯0
]
+
[
f
f¯
])
= 0,
where OG(2n) denotes the observability matrix associated with the (A,C) pair for 2n steps. The
result now follows by noting that the maximum rank of the matrix [OG(2n) −OG¯(2n)] is attained
at 2n. 
4.4 Weak Detectability
T -detectability, although useful to reduce the complexity of the proposed fault detection scheme,
can be rather strong in the sense that it is not hard to encounter faults in real applications that
are not T -detectable for any finite T . In this section, inspired by the indicators in discrete-event
systems diagnosis problems [52], we propose the notion of weak detectability that incorporates
language constraints on the hidden mode in the fault model. Since these indicators further restrict
the behavior of the fault, it enlarges the class of faults that can be detected within a finite horizon.
Let us motivate weak detectability and indicators with an example. Consider a building radiant
system with two modes that represent a controlled valve being open (mode 1) or closed (mode 2).
When the control logic is not modeled, this model allows arbitrary switching between the two modes.
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Now consider a problem with the valve, which prevents it from being totally closed. Therefore the
fault model consists of two modes: open and half-open. This fault model is not T -detectable
because if the valve is never commanded to close (i.e., system always operates in mode 1), it is
not possible to differentiate healthy system from the faulty one. On the other hand, this fault
only affects the operation of the system when the valve is commanded close so it will not be of
interest to detect it if the valve is never required to be closed. That is, the fault is relevant only if
mode 2 becomes active. In order to incorporate such information in the fault models, we introduce
indicators that shrink the behavior set of the SWA fault models by restricting their allowable mode
sequences. Let us now formally define what we mean by an indicator.
Definition 8 (indicator) Given a fault model Gf with s modes, let (Z+s )W be the set of all length-
W mode sequences. An indicator I is a subset of (Z+s )W for some W . The fault-indicator model
GfI is the fault model Gf whose mode sequences are restricted to I on the first W time steps after
the fault occurs.
Indicators can be compactly defined using bounded regular languages or fixed-length prefixes
of some linear temporal logic formula [53]. We also introduce a special class of indicators that we
represent by tuples
It .= (S,W,m,O), O ∈ {>,=, <},
where It consists of mode sequences of length W that contain modes from the set S ⊆ Z+s more
than (O is >), exactly (O is =), less than (O is <) m times. We have found this representation to
be convenient in various applications we considered.
The behaviors of fault-indicator models are defined similarly.
Definition 9 (fault-indicator behavior) The length-N behavior of the fault-indicator model GfI is
defined as:
BNFI(GfI )
.
=
{{uk,yk}N−1k=0 | uk ∈ U¯ and ∃xk ∈ X¯ , ηk ∈ E¯ ,∆k ∈ Ω¯, {σk}W−1k=0 ∈ I, s.t. (5) holds
for fault model parameters
}
.
In Def. 9, we assume that N ≥W . It is possible to relax this assumption by considering length-N
prefixes of sequences in I. Now we are ready to define T -weak detectability.
Definition 10 (T -weak detectability) The fault model Gf is T -weak detectable with indicator I
for the system model G, if the fault-indicator model GfI is T -detectable for G, that is, the following
holds:
BTswa(G) ∩ BTFI(GfI ) = ∅. (36)
Checking T -weak detectability also reduces to an equivalent MILP problem. Recall that the binary
variable di,j,k in (PT ) indicates if mode i of the system and mode j of the fault are active at time
k, hence
∑
i∈Z+s di,j,k = 1 indicates that mode j of the fault is active at time k. Then, if the mode
sequence of the fault is wm
.
= {σm0 . . . σmW−1} ∈ I, the following constraint needs to be enforced:∑
i∈Z+s (di,σm0 ,0 + di,σm1 ,1 + . . .+ di,σmW−1,W−1) = W. (37)
Since the mode sequence of the fault should follow at least one wm ∈ I, we have
bm
(∑
i∈Z+s (di,σm0 ,0 + . . .+ di,σmW−1,W−1)−W
)
= 0 (38)
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with
∑
m∈Z+` bm ≥ 1, where bm are new binary variables and `
.
= |I|. Finally, the change of
variables, dmi,σmk ,k
.
= bmdi,σmk ,k, and extra constraints, d
m
i,σmk ,k
≤ bm, converts (38) to the equivalent
MILP constraints : ∑
i∈Z+s d
m
i,σmk ,k
− bmW = 0,
dmi,σmk ,k
≤ bm,
∑
m∈Z+` bm ≥ 1.
(39)
In general, structured indicators can be expressed by much less number of MILP constraints. For
instance the indicators of form It = (S,W,m,>) can be expressed by a single MILP constraint:∑
i∈Z+s
∑
j∈S
∑
k∈Z+W di,j,k ≥ m. (40)
4.5 Overall Fault Detection Scheme
The overall fault detection scheme consists of an offline step and an online step. Given a system and
a fault model (possibly with indicators), we first analyze T -(weak) detectability running Algorithm
1 until it returns a T or maximum number of iterations are reached.
Algorithm 1 Calculating T
Input: T0, G, GfI
1. Initialize T = T0.
2. Set I ′ to length-T prefixes of I
3. Solve feasibility problem (PT ) with constraints (39) for I ′
4. If (PT ) is feasible:
• T = T + 1 and go to step 2
Else
• Return T
Assuming that Algorithm 1 returns a finite T , at run-time, we solve the problem (PMI) using
data from the last T steps at each time. By construction, any occurrence of the fault is guaranteed to
be detected since it renders (PMI) infeasible and a false alarm never occurs. In case, T -detectability
cannot be verified for a finite T , one can still use (PMI) in a receding horizon manner but the
occurrence of the fault can be missed in this case unless one uses increasing amounts of data at
each step. It is also worth noting that if an unmodeled fault occurs, it can still be detected in this
manner; i.e., any detection corresponds to an anomaly in the behavior of the system.
5 Generalizations
Thanks to the generality of the modeling framework, the fault detection scheme presented in this
paper can be applied to several other problems without any modifications. We briefly mention
some of these problems in this section.
5.1 Attack Detection
Recently, there has been a considerable interest in attack detection [54] and attack resilient esti-
mation [55,56] for cyber-physical systems. One can argue that fault detection and attack detection
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are different problems since, in general, an attacker, in addition to harming the system, has the
intention of not being noticed whereas the latter is not a concern for faults. However, since the
proposed framework takes a worst-case approach, it is also well suited for attack detection. The
only slight difference is that attack models are typically subject to more uncertainty than fault
models.
Consider the following linear state-space model subject to sensor attack taken from [55]:
xk+1 = Axk + Buk
yk = Cxk + ak + ηk
, (41)
where ak ∈ Rny is the attack vector at time instance k.
The system model corresponds to the case where ak = 0 in (41). Take as the fault (i.e., attack)
model as a switched linear system with s¯ =
∑
i∈Z+a
(ny
i
)
modes, where each mode represents one
possible attack scenario in which at most a sensors are attacked. If A ⊆ Z+ny , |A| ≤ a, is the set of
sensors attacked in mode j, then mode j has the form (41), with uncertain parameters aik 6= 0 (or,
|aik| ≥  if a minimum attack strength  is known), i ∈ A. Conditions like “the same set of sensors
are attacked persistently” can be included using indicators that restrict the switching between
attack modes. If this attack model can be shown to be T -detectable, running model invalidation
problem in a receding horizon manner detects the attacks. Moreover, if additional observability
conditions hold such as s-sparse observability in [55] with s = 2a, model invalidation problem
can be used for resilient state estimation with an additional constraint that limits the number of
attacked sensors. One can also precisely estimate the trade-off between the noise level and attack
magnitude by solving T -detectability problems with appropriately defined objectives. Note that
our framework trivially extends to the case where the system itself is switched or there are other
types of attacks if the goal is detecting the attacks. Obtaining conditions for state estimation
guarantees in this general setting is left for future work.
5.2 Cascaded Faults
By using indicators and the fact that the proposed framework handles switched systems, it is
possible to relax Assumption 1 on the persistency of the faults. In general, a system is subject
to multiple faults and these faults can occur in a cascaded fashion. Assume each such fault is
represented by an SWA model. It is possible to define a new SWA model whose number of modes
is the sum of the number of modes of the system model and each fault model. Then, the cascading
faults can be represented by restricting the mode sequences of this new SWA model with indicators
that capture potential a priori knowledge on the order of failures. Therefore, one can apply the
proposed framework to analyze T -detectability of multiple cascading faults and to detect non-
permanent faults.
6 Illustrative Examples
In this section, we consider one set of numerical examples and an example motivated by building
radiant systems to illustrate the efficacy of the methods proposed in this paper. All the examples
are implemented on a 3.5 GHz machine with 32 GB of memory running Ubuntu. For the implemen-
tation of model invalidation approach and finding T for T−detectability, we utilized Yalmip [57]
and CPLEX [9]. All the approaches and examples are implemented in Matlab, and are available
with MI4Hybrid2 toolbox.
2https://github.com/data-dynamics/MI4Hybrid
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6.1 Numerical Results
In this section, we illustrate the efficiency of the model invalidation approach proposed in this
paper in terms of execution-time for various time-horizons and number of modes of the system.
Consider a hidden-mode switched affine model, G6, with admissible sets X = {x | ‖x‖ ≤ 11},
U = {u | ‖u‖ ≤ 1000} and E = {η | ‖η‖ ≤ 0.1}. We assume there is no process noise and no
uncertainty in the parameters of the system. G6 has three states and six modes. We assume a fixed
B = [1 0 1]T and C = [1 1 1] for all modes. The system matrices of the modes are:
A1 =
 0.5 0.5 0.50.1 −0.2 0.5
−0.4 0.6 0.2
 , f1 =
10
0
 ,A2 =
 0.5 0.5 0.5−0.3 −0.2 0.3
0.1 −0.3 −0.5
 , f2 =
01
0

A3 =
 0.5 0.2 0.60.2 −0.2 0.2
−0.9 0.7 0.1
 , f3 =
00
1
 ,A4 =
−0.5 0.5 0.80.1 −0.2 −0.6
0.2 −0.6 0.3
 , f4 =
11
0

A5 =
 0.8 0.5 0.2−0.1 0.2 −0.3
0.5 0.4 −0.1
 , f5 =
01
1
 ,A6 =
−0.3 0.8 −0.10.4 −0.1 0.3
0.9 −0.2 0.6
 , f6 =
10
1
 .
Let us define, Gt, t = 1, . . . , 6, to be a system with the first t modes of G6. In addition, suppose
the fault, Gf , is an affine model with the following system matrices:
Af =
 0.8 0.7 0.60.1 −0.2 0.3
−0.4 0.3 −0.2
 ,Bf =
10
0
 , ff =
2.52.5
2.5
 . (42)
We first generate input-output trajectories from Gf of various lengths. We then fix the length
at 100 samples and investigate the effect of increasing the number of modes of the system. Both
examples are repeated for 10 times for randomly generated input and noise sequences. The results
for applying model invalidation in this setting are illustrated in Fig. 2. Although the execution-time
scales relatively reasonably with increasing horizon and number of modes, depending on the time-
scale of the system dynamics, solving only short horizon problems might be feasible for real-time
implementations, motivating T -detectability.
Finally, to compare the complexity of convex hull formulation of model invalidation problem
proposed in [10], and the big M formulation that is proposed in this paper, we illustrate the average
run-time for the system model with three modes, when the data is generated by faulty model for
different time horizon lengths. Fig. 3 shows the superiority of big M formulation for the model
invalidation problem.
6.2 Building Radiant Systems
6.2.1 System Model
We consider a building with four rooms of the same size. The building is equipped with a radiant
system with two pumps, adapted from [58] and illustrated in Fig. 4.
There is a concrete slab (core) between the rooms and the water pipes. We consider two cores,
one in contact with the water coming from pump 1 and the other in contact with water coming from
pump 2. We assume that the two pumps can either be on with known constant flow or off. Each
pump is connected to a valve, which adjusts the constant flow of the pump. The overall system
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Figure 2: The average execution time for invalidation of data generated by Gf for G3 on various
time horizons (left), and for Gt on a fixed time horizon of length 100 for different values of t (right).
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Figure 3: The average execution time for invalidation of data generated by Gf for G3 on various
time horizons for two formulations
can be described by an SWA model with six states that are corresponding to the temperatures
of the four rooms and the two cores. We assume that all of the states are measured with some
measurement noise. The system has four modes: mode 1 corresponds to the case where both pumps
are off, mode 2 is active when pump 1 is on and pump 2 is off, mode 3 represents the case when
pump 1 is off and pump 2 is on, and mode 4 is when both pumps are on.
When both pumps are on the core temperatures, Tc,1, Tc,2 evolve as a function of the parameters
of the system and the temperatures of the zones, Ti, i ∈ Z+4 , according to:
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Table 1
Parameter definition for radiant system
Ta ambient air temperature (
 C)
Ti air temperature of zone i (
 C)
Tc,i core temperature of zone i (
 C)
Tw,i
Supply water temperature of
zone i ( C)
Ki
thermal conductance between
Ti and Ta (W/m
2K)
Kc,i
thermal conductance between
Tc,i and Ti (W/m
2K)
Kw,i
piping thermal conductance of
zone i (W/m2K)
Kij
thermal conductance between
zone i and zone j (W/m2K)
Ci
thermal capacitance of zone i
(kJ/K)
Cc,i
thermal capacitance of the slab
of zone i (kJ/K)
of 5 minutes, where X = {x | 15  xi  19}, U = ;,
E = {⌘ | k⌘k  0.05}, and Gi is the discrete uncertain
a ne model of the ith mode. We assume the uncertainty
in the system is due to small changes in ambient tem-
perature (Ta = 10+   with k k  0.5). The e↵ect of the
uncertainty appears in the fi vector for each mode i.
6.2.2 Fault model
We assume that the valve of the second pump stuck
in middle and do not respond to on or o↵ commands.
In faulty mode the system has only two modes, which
correspond to the “on” or “o↵” states of the first pump.
This fault is modeled with a change in the second heat
conductance parameter, which is assumed to be Kw,2 =
0.5
0.05 when the fault occurs. This indicates the fact that
the heat transfer is cut in half, because of the slower
water flow.We assume the faulty model is represented by
GfR = (X , E ,U , { G ,fi }2i=1). This is an incipient fault and
hard to detect because the outputs can remain within
the reasonable range, and do not change dramatically.
6.2.3 Results
6.2.3.1 T -detectability: First, we analyze the T -
detectability of the pair (GR, GfR). In particular, our ap-
proach finds that for T = 8, this fault is detectable for
the radiant system. The iterations from T = 1 until de-
tectability is verified at T = 8 took 36.57 seconds with
the proposed approach. As a comparison, satisfiability
modulo theory (SMT) based approach proposed in [10]
took 10008.19 seconds. Although finding a T such that
a particular fault is T -detectable for a specific system is
an o✏ine step, hence, one can tolerate a slightly slower
algorithm, the MILP based approach proposed in this
paper shows significant improvement in execution time.
6.2.3.2 Fault detection: Next, we demonstrate the
proposed fault detection scheme on this system. In this
simulation, we generate data from the radiant system
model GR for 50 samples (four hours and ten minutes),
and the persistent fault GfR becomes active at time sam-
ple 51. The model invalidation problem is solved in re-
ceding horizon manner with horizon size 8. The fault is
detected at time sample 53. Simulation traces are shown
in Fig. 5. It is worth mentioning that T is calculated
based on the worst case scenario to provide guarantees
for detection, but for a particular realization of input-
output trajectory usually it is possible to detect the fault
earlier as is the case in this example.
6.2.3.3 Redundant sensors: In this subsection,
we show how T -detectability analysis can be used for
selecting “optimal” sensors for fault detection. We con-
sider five di↵erent scenarios, each corresponding to dif-
ferent set of states being measured as shown in Tab. 2.
For each of the scenarios, we consider the case with no
uncertainty and noise in the system and fault models,
e.g., E = {0} and ⌦ = {0}, where 0 indicates a vector of
zeros of appropriate dimension; and also the noise and
uncertainty models used in this section earlier. We com-
pute the minimum T -values for each scenario to achieve
T -detectability as listed in Tab. 2. From these results we
see that measuring the core temperatures seems crucial,
especially in case of uncertainty and noise, for detecting
this fault.
Table 2
Value of T for the five scenarios, under two model assump-
tions of with and without uncertainty and noise.
Measured States
T (no
uncertainty)
T (with
uncertainty)
Tc,1, Tc,2, T1, T2, T3, T4 1 6
Tc,2, T1, T2, T3, T4 1 6
T1, T2, T3, T4 2 > 100
Tc,1, Tc,2, T1, T2 2 6
Tc,2, T1, T3 2 7
6.2.3.4 Weak-detectability: Consider a variant of
the fault model described in Subsection 6.2.2 where the
second valve can be closed, but when the pump is on
it can only open up to the half of its capacity. Such
a fault is not T -detectable for any finite T , because it
shares two modes with the a priori system model. Prob-
lem (PT ) is always feasible, because there always exists
a switching sequence that matches the fault and system
model, which is the one that keeps the second pump al-
ways o↵. In order to detect such a fault, activation of the
“on” mode for second pump is necessary, which corre-
sponds to the third and fourth modes of the fault model.
We capture this with an indicator of the form It =
({3, 4}, 1, 1,=). This indicator is incorporated in to prob-
lem (PT ) via the constraint:
P
i2Z+4
P4
j=3 di,j,t T+1 = 1.
Solving problem (PT ) with this extra constraint renders
T = 8. In order to illustrate the use of weak-detectability
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Figure 4: Left: four zone radiant system with two pumps. Right: parameter definitions and units
for the radiant system.
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Figure 5: Fault detection results on t data, which consists of outputs of th system until time
sample 50 and the outputs of the f ulty system afterwards.
Cc,1T˙c,1(t) =Kc,1(T1 − Tc,1) +Kc,3(T3 − Tc,1) +Kw,1(Tw,1 − Tc,1) (43)
Cc,2T˙c,2(t) =Kc,2(T2 − Tc,2) +Kc,4(T4 − Tc,2) +Kw,2(Tw,2 − Tc,2). (44)
If the first (second) pump is off, the last term in (43) (in (44)) becomes zero. The rest of state
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equations do not change with the status of the two pumps and are as follows:
C1T˙1(t) =Kc,1(Tc,1 − T1) +K1(Ta − T1) +K12(T2 − T1) +K13(T3 − T1)
C2T˙2(t) =Kc,2(Tc,2 − T2) +K2(Ta − T2) +K12(T1 − T2) +K24(T2 − T4)
C3T˙3(t) =Kc,1(Tc,1 − T3) +K3(Ta − T3) +K13(T1 − T3) +K34(T4 − T3)
C4T˙4(t) =Kc,2(Tc,2 − T4) +K4(Ta − T4) +K24(T2 − T4) +K34(T3 − T4).
The list of parameters are given in Fig. 4 and their values3 are adapted from [58].
The discrete-time switched affine model GR = (X , E ,U , { G∆i }4i=1) for the system is obtained
with sampling time of 5 minutes, where X = {x | 15 ≤ xi ≤ 19}, U = ∅, E = {η | ‖η‖ ≤ 0.05},
and Gi is the discrete uncertain affine model of the ith mode. We assume the uncertainty in the
system is due to small changes in ambient temperature (Ta = 10 + δ with ‖δ‖ ≤ 0.5). The effect of
the uncertainty appears in the fi vector for each mode i.
6.2.2 Fault model
We assume that the valve of the second pump stuck in middle and do not respond to on or off
commands. In faulty mode the system has only two modes, which correspond to the “on” or “off”
states of the first pump. This fault is modeled with a change in the second heat conductance
parameter, which is assumed to be Kw,2 =
0.5
0.05 when the fault occurs. This indicates the fact that
the heat transfer is cut in half, because of the slower water flow. We assume the faulty model is
represented by GfR = (X , E ,U , { G∆,fi }2i=1). This is an incipient fault and hard to detect because
the outputs can remain within the reasonable range, and do not change dramatically.
6.2.3 Results
T -detectability: First, we analyze the T -detectability of the pair (GR, GfR). In particular, our
approach finds that for T = 8, this fault is detectable for the radiant system. The iterations from
T = 1 until detectability is verified at T = 8 took 36.57 seconds with the proposed approach. As
a comparison, satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) based approach proposed in [10] took 10008.19
seconds. Although finding a T such that a particular fault is T -detectable for a specific system
is an offline step, hence, one can tolerate a slightly slower algorithm, the MILP based approach
proposed in this paper shows significant improvement in execution time.
Fault detection: Next, we demonstrate the proposed fault detection scheme on this system. In
this simulation, we generate data from the radiant system model GR for 50 samples (four hours and
ten minutes), and the persistent fault GfR becomes active at time sample 51. The model invalidation
problem is solved in receding horizon manner with horizon size 8. The fault is detected at time
sample 53. Simulation traces are shown in Fig. 5. It is worth mentioning that T is calculated based
on the worst case scenario to provide guarantees for detection, but for a particular realization of
input-output trajectory usually it is possible to detect the fault earlier as is the case in this example.
Redundant sensors: In this subsection, we show how T -detectability analysis can be used for
selecting “optimal” sensors for fault detection. We consider five different scenarios, each corre-
sponding to different set of states being measured as shown in Tab. 1. For each of the scenarios,
3Ta = 10, K1 = K2 =
1
2.1
, K3 = K4 =
1
2.2
, Kc,1 = Kc,3 =
1
0.125
, Kc,2 = Kc,4 =
1
0.130
, K12 = K13 = K24 =
K34 =
1
0.16
, Kw,1 =
1
0.07
, Kw,2 =
1
0.05
, C1 = 1900, C2 = 2100, C3 = 2000, C4 = 1800, Cc,1 = 3000, Cc,2 = 4000,
Tw,1 = Tw,2 = 18.
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we consider the case with no uncertainty and noise in the system and fault models, e.g., E = {0}
and Ω = {0}, where 0 indicates a vector of zeros of appropriate dimension; and also the noise
and uncertainty models used in this section earlier. We compute the minimum T -values for each
scenario to achieve T -detectability as listed in Tab. 1. From these results we see that measuring
the core temperatures seems crucial, especially in case of uncertainty and noise, for detecting this
fault.
Table 1: Value of T for the five scenarios, under two model assumptions of with and without
uncertainty and noise.
Measured States T (no uncertainty) T (with uncertainty)
Tc,1, Tc,2, T1, T2, T3, T4
1 6
Tc,2, T1, T2, T3, T4 1 6
T1, T2, T3, T4 2 > 100
Tc,1, Tc,2, T1, T2 2 6
Tc,2, T1, T3 2 7
Weak-detectability: Consider a variant of the fault model described in Subsection 6.2.2 where
the second valve can be closed, but when the pump is on it can only open up to the half of its
capacity. Such a fault is not T -detectable for any finite T , because it shares two modes with the
a priori system model. Problem (PT ) is always feasible, because there always exists a switching
sequence that matches the fault and system model, which is the one that keeps the second pump
always off. In order to detect such a fault, activation of the “on” mode for second pump is necessary,
which corresponds to the third and fourth modes of the fault model. We capture this with an
indicator of the form It = ({3, 4}, 1, 1,=). This indicator is incorporated into problem (PT ) via the
constraint:
∑
i∈Z+4
∑4
j=3 di,j,t−T+1 = 1. Solving problem (PT ) with this extra constraint renders
T = 8. In order to illustrate the use of weak-detectability in the fault detection scheme, we generate
an output sequence from the faulty model as follows: (i) samples 1-30 are generated by the first
two modes of faulty system; (ii) sample 31 is generated by one of the last two modes of the faulty
system, and is followed by 9 samples generated by the first two modes; and (iii) samples 41-75 are
generated by allowing any mode of the faulty system to be active. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the
first detection occurs immediately after the first switch to the modes where second pump is “on”.
The fault is also detected for all samples after 43, where there is switching to the last two modes.
Recall that, the mode signal is not measured by our fault detection scheme. As one can see the
fault is not detected in the first 30 samples, because the second pump is always “off” during that
period. Note that the fault does not affect the behavior of the system in the first two hours and
forty minutes and detecting it is impossible.
7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we present a fault detection scheme that guarantees the detection of particular faults
and can be implemented in real-time for many applications. The proposed scheme is applicable
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Figure 6: Weak-detectability results, where one of the last two modes of faulty model is activated
at sample 31 for the first time and after sample 41. The red dashed line in the bottom figures is 1
when a fault is detected.
to an expressive class of system and fault models, namely hidden-mode switched affine models
with parametric uncertainty. The modeling framework is further extended to include language
constraints on the modes and necessary and sufficient conditions for detectability using a receding
horizon scheme are provided based on MILP. The key step in efficiency of implementation is the
ability to preserve detection guarantees while using the receding horizon scheme as a result of T -
detectability property. T -detectability essentially tells us how much data is enough for detecting
a fault by utilizing the knowledge of a (possibly uncertain) fault model and the structure in the
dynamics. With the advances in MILP-solvers, there has been a resurge of interest in using it in
control design and real-time implementations [59]. Here we leverage such advances in the context
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of fault detection. In particular, since we only solve MILP feasibility problems (as opposed to
optimization), this leads to a fairly efficient scheme as demonstrated via examples.
In the future, we are interested in applying similar ideas to fault isolation and active fault
detection. We also have some ongoing work on fault detection for nonlinear hybrid systems.
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